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Abstract: This article investigates the phenomenon of litigation undertaken by Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), often referred to 
as ‘patent trolls’, within the legal system of the Patents Court (PHC) of England and Wales during the period 2000-2008. Our 
analysis shows that patent suits involving PAEs at the PHC are rare – they account for less than 6% of all patent cases. We suggest 
two reasons why the PHC does not provide a welcome venue for PAE litigation. Firstly, the majority of patent cases which reach 
a judgment in the UK result in a ruling invalidating the patent. Secondly, the costs regime in the legal system of England and 
Wales requires that the losing party pay the costs of the other side. In other words, even if its own costs are kept low, a PAE 
which loses a case may have to spend a substantial amount of money in order to cover the costs of the other side. When taken 
together, it is likely that these two aspects discourage litigation by PAEs at the PHC, which accounts for the low volume of cases 
when compared with other jurisdictions such as the US. We also offer interesting insights to the wider debate concerning whether 
it is likely that in the near future there will be a similar increase in PAE litigation in Europe as has already occurred in the US over 
the last decade. This article also discusses potential implications for the design of the proposed European Unified Patent Court. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Patents are designed to encourage innovation by granting temporary, exclusive intellectual property rights (IPR) 
with respect to an invention, thereby enabling transactions concerning these inventions via licensing and 
assignment agreements. There is no doubt that the enforceability of patents in court is of crucial importance 
within this system. Without the possibility of taking an infringement action, the patent holder would have little 
leverage to prevent the copying of a patented technology, or to negotiate with parties who seek to use the 
patented technology. In this view, litigation undertaken by so-called patent-assertion entities (PAEs), sometimes 
also referred to as ‘nonproducing entities’ or ‘patent trolls’,1 could be seen as achieving precisely this goal - 
enforcing the right to financial compensation for the use of a patented invention by third parties accords with the 
                                                     
* Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and SERC LSE, christian.helmers@uc3m.es, London School of Economics (LSE), l.t.mcdonagh@lse.ac.uk, 
respectively. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the UK Intellectual Property Office and the ZEW SEEK “Patent Litigation in 
Europe” project. The views expressed here are those of the authors. They are not necessarily those of the UK Intellectual Property Office. We 
are indebted to Max Ernicke for his generous advice and help. We benefitted from comments by participants of the 12th annual Intellectual 
Property Scholars Conference at Stanford University and  seminars at the UK Intellectual Property Office in August and September 2012. 
1 In our analysis, we focus on companies that have been characterised as PAEs in the existing literature. This excludes universities and 
independent inventors, which is why we prefer to use the term PAE instead of non-producing entity or troll - Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notices and Remedies with Competition (2011); accessible at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.  
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underlying rationales of the patent system.2 However, as will be discussed over the course of this article, litigation 
by PAEs has provoked a large amount of critical academic analysis, as well as unprecedented media scrutiny.3  
In the literature, there is no single definition of ‘PAE’, though commonly it is a legal entity, often a registered 
company, which holds patents for certain products or processes, but which typically does not actually ‘produce’ 
any products of its own, and which furthermore has obtained its patents via means other than by conducting 
R&D itself.4 In this view, a PAE does not innovate – instead, a PAE’s business model focuses on enforcing its 
acquired patents, often via litigation against other companies which, unlike PAEs, are in the business of 
manufacturing and marketing new products.5 The aim of this tactic is to negotiate licence fees for the use of the 
patented technology – fees which have often been considered excessive relative to the contribution of the 
asserted patents to the allegedly infringing product.6 The potential success of this strategy rests upon the 
possibility that the activities of other innovative companies infringe upon the PAE’s patents. This is important 
because a PAE will typically assert a patent when a manufacturer has already invested the sunk costs of bringing a 
product to market.7 In this context, the threat of litigation from a PAE and a (preliminary) injunction handed out 
by a court could mean that producing companies are forced to place on ‘hold’ the marketing of the disputed 
product, or the launch of other new products, something which in turn could severely threaten the eventual 
profitability of the product and the future of the company.8  It is for this reason that PAEs are often given the 
                                                     
2  J. McDonough, ‘The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy,’ Emory Law Journal 
56 (2006), 189-211. N. Myhrvold, ‘The Big Idea: Funding Eureka!,’ Harvard Business Review (March, 2010), paragraph 7; accessible at 
http://hbr.org/2010/03/the-big-idea-funding-eureka/ar/1. 
3 For example National Public Radio, ‘The American Life, When Patents Attack’ (22 July 2011). See also 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/nov/09/patent-trolls-make-mischief;   
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-innovations/where-are-the-jobs-ask-the-patent-trolls/2012/05/07/gIQAdIE08T_story.html;   
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/30/business/economy/tech-lawsuits-endanger-innovation.html;   
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/gadgets/start-up-gegen-handy-hersteller-undurchsichtige-geschaefte-mit-apple-patenten-a-803175.htmln;   
http://business.financialpost.com/2012/07/23/apple-microsoft-settle-patent-fight-with-rim-foe 
ntp/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter.  
4  There are many different definitions of PAEs and their main characteristics. The most common definition focuses on the lack of any 
productive and inventive activity. Other definitions also take into account the circumstances under which such PAEs acquire patents (e.g. from 
bankrupt companies). See E. S. K. Ng, ‘Patent Trolling: Innovation at Risk,’ European Intellectual Property Review 31(12) (2009), 593-608, 596. See 
also  C. Chien, ‘Predicting Patent Litigation,’ Texas Law Review 90 (2011), 283-329, at 292, S. Subramanian, ‘Patent Trolls in Thickets: Who is 
Fishing Under the Bridge?,’ European Intellectual Property Review 30(5) (2008), 182-188, at 182; and description posted at 
https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/background/. 
5  Risch offers some evidence on the origin of patents enforced by PAEs in the US. He finds the large majority of patents to have been 
previously owned by producing entities. M. Risch, ‘Patent Troll Myths,’ Seton Hall Law Review 42 (2012), 457-499, at 484-486. 
6  Layne-Farrar and Schmidt (2010) argue that from a theoretical point of view, depending on the downstream market structure there is no 
reason to expect non-practicing entities to charge higher (or even excessive) royalties than practicing entities. The crucial aspect is whether PAEs 
are able to exploit a patent hold-up, that is, to threaten a producer with an injunction after the producer has made the sunk investment. 
Empirical data on licensing fees are usually not available as the outcome of licensing negotiations is normally not disclosed in much detail. 
Licensing agreements usually occur as part of a settlement which is commonly not recorded as part of court proceedings. Bessen and Meurer 
(2012) offer some survey-based evidence for the US that indicates that the mean settlements costs due to the licensing agreement accepted by 
defendants sued by PAEs are on average US$ 6.3 million. Their survey data suggests even higher numbers for licensing agreements that were 
arranged before a court case was filed, with average licensing fees amounting to US$ 24.6 million. Still, it is difficult to gauge from these absolute 
figures whether the settlement costs are excessive. A. Layne-Farrar and K. M. Schmidt, ‘Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls,” 
Market Structure and “Excessive” Royalties’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal 25 (2010) 1121-1144; J. Bessen and M. J. Meurer, ‘The Direct Costs 
from NPE Disputes,’ Boston University School of Law Working Paper 12-34 (2012). 
M. Reitzig, J. Henkel, and C. Heath, ‘On Sharks, Trolls, and Their Patent Prey – Unrealistic Damage Awards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being   
Infringed”,’ Research Policy 36 (2006), 134-154. 
8  This situation may arise either because firms are unaware of existing patents or because the validity of existing patents is uncertain. C. Shapiro, 
‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Settings’ in Adam Jaffe et al (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy 
(Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001), 119-150, at 125. See also M. Lemley and C. Shapiro, ‘Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking’ Texas Law Review 
85 (2007) 1991-2049, J. Gregory, ‘The Patent Troll Next Door,’ John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property 6 (2007), 292-309 and C. Tucker, ‘Patent 
Trolls and Technology Diffusion,’ TILEC Discussion Paper 2012-030 (2012); accessible at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2136955. For an understanding of how poorly managed property systems can produce 
innovation problems see M. A. Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,’ Harvard Law 
Review 111(3) (1998), 621-688. 
  
Christian Helmers and Luke McDonagh                                                                                                         Trolls at the High Court?  
 
 3 
unflattering description ‘patent trolls’ – entities ‘lurking under the bridge’ whose only function is to extract licence 
fees from other companies, often via the threat of legal action or the actual taking of litigation.  
Due to the fact that there is no one accepted definition of PAE or ‘patent troll’, it is sometimes suggested 
that a wider understanding of the concept should be adopted, focusing on ‘trolling behaviour’, rather than on a 
particular type of ‘troll’ company.9  In this view, the tactic of ‘trolling’ litigation could be undertaken by a number 
of different types of companies, including companies that do conduct their own R&D, and even companies 
which manufacture products. There is merit to this view - as discussed further below, there is evidence that PAE-
style litigation is now widespread within certain industries, especially among the large technology manufacturers 
and producers including Nokia, Research in Motion, Apple, Microsoft, and Google. Nevertheless, the 
phenomenon of litigation undertaken by the ‘classic’ type of PAE is worth investigating. We describe our 
methodology for identifying the PAEs in our dataset in Section 3 of this article. 
Furthermore, it is notable that the problem of the ‘patent troll’ arises during a period when many are 
questioning whether the practice of patenting actually lives up to the promise of increasing levels of innovation, 
especially within the information and communication technology (ICT) industries.10 For instance, a recent study 
notes that approximately one third of all European patents are not utilised for an industrial or directly 
commercial purpose, and furthermore it states that one sixth are used in order to ‘block’ competitors from 
engaging in research surrounding the protected patent.11 Within this current debate, concerning the nature and 
value of the patent system, it is arguable that litigation by PAEs is of particular significance. While it is true in 
some respects that PAEs ‘enable transactions’, which is one of the aims of patenting, it is also true that the 
actions of PAEs may effectively stifle, and can even halt, innovation.12 Indeed, it is often remarked that PAE 
litigation threatens rates of innovation and economic growth. For instance, it has been claimed that PAEs 
represent a “socially wasteful” business activity, diverting resources from more useful areas to the fora of 
litigation.13 If true, PAE litigation, in addition to creating an economic and legal quagmire, would also provide a 
challenge to the justificatory theories underlying the patent system.14  
Within the global sphere of patent litigation, the majority of scholarship has focused on PAE litigation 
within the US jurisdiction, while there has been a comparative lack of similar analysis with regard to European 
jurisdictions, including the UK. With this in mind, this article sheds light on PAE litigation at the Patents Court 
(PHC) of England and Wales.15 We provide a detailed analysis of all the cases that involved a PAE filed between 
2000 and 2008 at the PHC. We discuss the characteristics of the enforcement system that are directly relevant to 
litigation involving PAEs in England and Wales. This includes both an examination of the issues in each case, 
such as questions of validity and infringement, and a discussion of the ultimate results and costs of litigation. We 
                                                     
9 See E. S. K. Ng, ‘Patent Trolling: Innovation at Risk,’ European Intellectual Property Review 31(12) (2009), 593-608, at 596. 
10 The New York Times, (15 July 15 2007) - 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/business/yourmoney/15proto.html?_r=1&ex=1342152000&en=17ab981b1b3cf1dd&ei=5090&partner
=rssuserland&emc=rss.  
11 Study on Evaluating the Knowledge Economy: What are Patents Actually Worth? The Value of Patents for Today’s Economy and Society,’ 
Final Report , 23 July 2006, 10; accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/studies/final_report_lot2_en.pdf  
12 C. Tucker, ‘Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion,’ TILEC Discussion Paper 2012-030 (2012); accessible at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2136955. 
13 J. Bessen, M. Meurer, and J. Ford, ‘The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls,’ Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper 11-
45 (2011), 26-35, at 31.  
14 For a discussion of the most frequently cited justifications for patent law, see F. Machlup and E. Penrose, ‘The Patent Controversy in the 
Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History 10(1) (1950), 1-26. For discussion of the need to reconcile the need for greater levels of 
innovation and economic growth with the justifications for stronger intellectual property rights protection see D. S. Davies, ‘The Early History 
of the Patent Specification’, Law Quarterly Review 50 (1934), 86-109;  E.C. Hettinger, ‘Justifying Intellectual Property’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 
18 (1989), 31-52; J. West, ‘Does Appropriability Enable or Retard Innovation’, in H. Chesbrough et.al (eds.), Open Innovation; Researching A New 
Paradigm (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 109-133, at111; V. Shiva, Protect or Plunder? Understanding Intellectual Property Rights (London, Zed 
Books, 2001), 21-26; O. Granstrand ‘Intellectual Property Rights for Governance in and of Innovation Systems’ in B. Anderson (ed.), Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation, Governance and the Institutional Environment (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006), 311-344, at  317; and L. Bently and B. 
Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (3rd ed.) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), at 339-340. 
15 There is no unified legal system for the UK. England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland have separate legal systems and courts. 
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also draw on comparisons of the characteristics of the lawsuits, the litigating parties, and the litigated patents 
between the cases that involve PAEs and all other patent cases heard by the PHC. In addition, our data enable us 
to go one step further and to compare the patents involved in the PAE court cases with the overall population of 
patents protecting similar technologies. 
In this context, it is notable that ‘patent trolls’ are much less visible in Europe than in the US. For this 
reason it has been remarked that the European patent system may contain unique factors which are capable of 
‘taming’ the patent trolls.16 For example, commentators note that a crucial factor concerns the fact that software 
and business method patents are much more difficult to obtain in Europe than the US.17 Also of importance is 
the fact that even within the European Patent Convention (EPC) system, patents ultimately turn into national 
rights, which must be enforced before national courts, something which substantially increases the costs and 
complexity of litigation when compared to the US jurisdiction. In this article we offer two additional factors 
present within the patent enforcement system in England and Wales which appear to mitigate, or ‘tame’, PAE 
behaviour. Firstly, the majority of patent cases that reach a judgment in the UK result in a ruling invalidating the 
patent. In cases involving PAEs during 2000-2008, only in one minor part of one case was a PAE patent found 
to be valid. The likelihood of a patent being declared invalid by the PHC is therefore high. Secondly, the costs 
regime in the legal system of England and Wales requires that the losing party pay the costs of the other side. 
Given the relatively high costs of patent suits before the PHC,18 this means that, even if its own costs are kept 
low, a PAE which loses a case may have to spend a substantial amount of money in order to pay the costs of the 
other side. When taken together, these two aspects discourage litigation by PAEs at the PHC. As a result, within 
the UK jurisdiction the problems associated with PAEs stifling innovation appear to be somewhat mitigated. 
This could help explain the low number of cases involving PAEs before the PHC - they account for less than 6% 
of all patent cases between 2000 and 2008. Further to this, we present data regarding the type of patents that are 
enforced by PAEs and the defence mechanisms employed by the alleged infringers.19 
Hence, over the course of this article we primarily seek to analyse the cases brought by PAEs before the 
PHC and to assess the characteristics of the patents enforced by PAEs in these cases. While this article therefore 
does not provide any direct answers with regard to the impact of PAEs on rates of innovation more generally, it 
does add a substantial amount of empirical evidence to this current debate. We also offer interesting insights to 
the wider debate concerning whether it is likely that in the near future there will be a similar increase in PAE 
litigation in Europe as has already occurred in the US over the last decade (see Section 2). This article also 
discusses what the characteristics of an enforcement system which aims to limit potentially socially disruptive 
behaviour by PAEs would be. This has not only potential implications for the design of the proposed European 
Unified Patent Court, but could also prove useful for the general understanding of incentives provided by 
enforcement systems for PAE litigation. 
The following section discusses the concept of PAEs and the existing relevant literature in more detail. 
Section 3 provides a detailed analysis of all court cases before the Patents Court during the period 2000-2008 that 
involved a PAE, together with a discussion of the relevant characteristics of the patent enforcement system of 
England and Wales. Section 4 summarises our findings and offers some concluding thoughts. 
                                                     
16 A. Mayergoyz, ‘Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls,’ Cornell International Law Review 42 (2009), 241-270, at 257.  
17 S. J. Marsnik and R. E. Thomas, ‘Drawing a Line in the Patent-Subject Matter Sands: Does Europe Provide a Solution to the Software and 
Business Method Patent Problem,’ Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 34 (2011), 227-328, at 230-233. 
18 C. Helmers and L. McDonagh, ‘Patent Litigation in the UK,’  LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 12/2012 
19 Schwartz and Kesan (2012) criticise the economic approach of assessing the costs and benefits of PAE litigation and instead argue that the 
relevant issue is whether PAEs file frivolous lawsuits to enforce patents that should not have been granted and that are most likely not infringed 
by the alleged infringers. Our analysis, therefore, adds empirical evidence to the existing literature along the lines suggested by Schwartz and 
Kesan. D. L. Schwartz and J. P. Kesan, ‘Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System,’ Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper 13-01 (2012). 
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2. PATENT-ASSERTION ENTITIES (PAEs) 
 
The PAE business model is highly controversial. As noted above, the model envisages the PAE enforcing its 
acquired patents against producing companies. Therefore, for a PAE, a law suit primarily provides the 
opportunity for the negotiation and collection of settlement payments. Filing a law suit against a potential 
infringer may provide a PAE with leverage over a producing entity in a number of ways. For instance, due to the 
fact that patent litigation by PAEs is undoubtedly a worldwide phenomenon, it is possible for a PAE to file a law 
suit against a producing company simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions.20  Via this multifaceted set of legal 
actions a PAE may be able to obtain an injunction preventing, or ‘holding up’, the sale of a product.21 Even if an 
injunction is not granted, or is only granted in a single jurisdiction/market, the mere possibility of this occurring 
may encourage the producing company to enter into a licence agreement with the PAE, which could in turn 
provide the PAE with a lucrative source of licensing revenue.22 In addition, alleged infringers may also prefer to 
make a quick settlement with the PAE instead of engaging in a lengthy and potentially costly lawsuit aimed at 
invalidating the PAE’s patent, a scenario which may enable a PAE to effectively enforce a weak patent which 
would otherwise be found invalid by a court.23 Furthermore, settlements are commonplace in cases involving 
PAEs - it is very rare for defendants to be found by the court to have actually copied a patented technology.24 
Although it cannot be said that settlements between PAEs and producing companies always favour the PAE, as 
stated above there are notable examples of settlements which have involved a large producing company paying a 
substantial licence fee to a PAE. 
In light of this, there is growing widespread concern among policy makers that patent litigation by PAEs is 
becoming a disruptive force with respect to product market competition and innovation.25 There is ample 
anecdotal evidence to suggest that PAE litigation may have a disruptive effect on high-tech companies, especially 
in the telecommunication and software industries.26 In the information and communication technology (ICT) 
sector profitability largely depends on products reaching the market place before a competitor’s similar product, 
therefore the problem of bringing to market a (new) product which is threatened by a ‘hold-up’ is particularly 
evident.27 In addition, patents on ICT technologies are often characterised by low substitutability, which can 
attribute a disproportionate level of importance to an individual patent despite its relatively minor contribution to 
                                                     
20 This opens the possibility for forum-shopping, meaning that PAEs may strategically choose their favoured jurisdiction to enforce a patent and 
use a favourable judgement to negotiate licensing agreements in other jurisdictions. 
21 For example, IPCom, a PAE according to our definition, was granted an injunction by the district court in Düsseldorf, Germany, against 
manufacturers Nokia and HTC in April 2012 which forced Deutsche Telekom to stop selling Nokia and HTC phones. 
22 Perhaps the most prominent example of this is shown by the case of a PAE called NTP, Inc., which obtained a settlement payment of US$ 
612.5 million with regard to an infringement action involving Research In Motion (RIM), the manufacturer of the ‘Blackberry’ device, in 2006. 
The case received much media attention, see for instance CNN (3 March  2006) http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/ 
and MSNBC (3 March  2006) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11659304/ns/technology_and_science-wireless/t/settlement-reached-
blackberry-patent-case/.  
23 The alleged infringer faces a public good problem: invalidating the PAE-owned patent will likely benefit other companies, including its 
competitors, while it has to bear the costs on its own. For an example of a recent high cost settlement see Rambus’ $900m settlement with 
Samsung; article accessible at http://venturebeat.com/2010/01/19/rambus-and-samsung-bury-the-hatchet-with-900m-settlement/.  
24 J. Bessen and M. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges Bureaucrats and Lawyers Put Innovation at Risk (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 
2008), at 128. See also C. A. Cotropia and M. Lemley, ‘Copying in Patent law,’ North Carolina Law Review 87 (2009), 1421-1466. 
25 See generally Federal Trade Commission, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition (2011); accessible at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf.  
26 See for example Julia Kollewe, ‘Patent Trolls in Piney Woods Make Mischief for Innovators Everywhere,’ The Guardian 9 November 2011). 
27 See high profile disputes between Apple and Samsung where each company attempted to block the sale of competing tablet computers: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203711104577200781450630136.html; 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/samsung/8691707/Samsung-Galaxy-Tab-10.1-blocked-in-Europe.html.  
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a product. In addition, patents on ICT-related technologies often cover software and business methods patents - 
patents which have been shown to often have fuzzy boundaries.28 In particular, the existence of numerous ‘fuzzy’ 
software and business method patents enables the creation of ‘patent thickets’ i.e. fields of broad, overlapping 
patent claims.29 Furthermore, the existence of standards and standard-essential patents, often necessitated by the 
need for interoperability, is also common in the ICT sector. This enhances the potential importance of individual 
patents, owned by PAEs, which cover ‘essential standards’. The available empirical evidence supports the 
conclusion that patents on ICT-related technologies are most frequently asserted by PAEs, whereas PAEs very 
rarely litigate patents in the areas of chemicals and pharmaceuticals.30  
Defenders of PAEs argue that the PAE business model enables the monetisation of patents, and by 
extension the monetisation of inventions, in the so-called “market for technology.”31 In this view, it is argued that 
the behaviour of PAEs is fully in line with the spirit of patent law because PAEs do enable transactions.32 
Furthermore, an inventor may choose to assign, or sell, his or her patents to a PAE in order to maximise his own 
revenue stream because a PAE is likely to be in a better position to negotiate a higher licence fee than the 
individual inventor. This is especially plausible with regard to small-scale individual inventors who may lack the 
resources to enforce their patents against large manufacturing companies. It could also be argued that new 
ventures might benefit from the option of selling patents to PAEs as this may increase their salvage value in case 
of bankruptcy. However, recent scholarship pours scorn on the supposed ‘positive’ effects of PAE activities. 
Bessen et al. suggest that while PAEs have the effect of enabling a market for patents, this may not enable a 
market for technology. In fact, the behaviour of PAEs tends to inhibit a true market for technology by 
discouraging R&D in areas where there is a high probability of PAE litigation occurring. In addition, Bessen et al. 
demonstrate that very little of the revenue raised by PAEs via litigation finds its way back to inventors.33 Bessen 
et al. remark that “there are a lot of big losers” from PAE litigation, “while hardly anyone benefits much”.34 
As discussed above, the notion of ‘PAE’ is not static. In fact, two new forms of PAE-types have come into 
view of late. In addition to PAE ownership, ICT patents are also often owned by product market competitors, 
such as Nokia, Research In Motion, Apple, Microsoft, Google, and Samsung. This increases the potential for 
litigation to occur. One new type of PAE is armed with patents assigned to it by large producing companies. 
From the point of view of the producing companies, the underlying purpose of this activity appears to be to 
make use of the PAE to attack the producing companies’ direct competitors, which illustrates that PAEs may 
have already become a tool for moving competition from the product market into the court room.35 Often 
considerable uncertainty surrounds the assignment of patents to these PAEs, which makes it difficult to gauge 
the motives of litigation, and hence for competing companies to obtain reasonable settlement agreements. 
                                                     
28 J. Bessen, M. Meurer, and J. Ford, “The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls”, Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper 
11-45, (2011), 1-35; available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1930272 or at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1930272. 
29 G. von Graevenitz, S. Wagner, and D. Harhoff, ‘How to Measure Patent Thickets – a Novel Approach,’ Economics Letters, Vol. 111 (2011),  6-9; 
and C. Shapiro, ‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Settings’ in A. Jaffe et al. (eds.), Innovation Policy and the 
Economy (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2001), at 124-127. See also The Guardian, (J. Halliday and C. Arthur, ‘Microsoft sues Motorola over 
Android – and all the other mobile lawsuits, visually,’ 4 October 2010); accessible at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/oct/04/microsoft-motorola-android-patent-lawsuit.  
30 M. Risch, ‘Patent Troll Myths,’ Seton Hall Law Review, Vol. 42, (2012), 457-499, at 477-478. 
31 N. Myhrvold, ‘The Big Idea: Funding Eureka!,’ Harvard Business Review (March 2010), paragraph 7; accessible at http://hbr.org/2010/03/the-
big-idea-funding-eureka/ar/1. 
32 J. McDonough, ‘The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy,’ Emory Law Journal 
56 (2006), 186-228, at 190. 
33 J. Bessen, M. Meurer, and J. Ford, ‘The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls,’ Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper 11-
45, (2011), 1-35, at 28. 
34 Ibid.. at 33. 
35 In June 2012 Google accused Microsoft and Nokia of funnelling patents to a PAE, Mosaid, in order to increase Mosaid’s patent pool, and thus 
its leverage at negotiating licence fees from companies such as Google – The Guardian (C. Arthur, ‘Microsoft and Nokia hit back at Google 
“patent troll” claims,’ 1 June 2012); accessible at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jun/01/microsoft-nokia-google-patent-troll.  
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Nevertheless, it is plausible that this tactic could be used to weaken a competing firm, or it could even enable a 
large company to push a smaller firm out of the market entirely. The other new PAE-type which has emerged is 
the so-called ‘patent mass aggregator’. These mass aggregators share many characteristics with PAEs, but they 
appear to raise the stakes of the game. Feldman and Ewing for example estimate that Intellectual Ventures (IV), 
probably the most well-known and notorious patent aggregator, owns around 30,000 to 60,000 patents 
worldwide and has spread the ownership of its portfolio across a cobweb of at least 1,200 shell companies.36 To 
finance its activities, Feldman and Ewing report that IV has raised at least US$5 billion in funding. Further to 
this, a lot of uncertainty surrounds the business of patent mass aggregators. It appears that their goal is to not 
only acquire patents for their own litigation purposes, but also to engage in agreements to generate licensing 
revenue for other patent-owning companies by enforcing their patents on their behalf, for instance by  acting as 
exclusive licensees of the other companies’ patents. Mass aggregators can also provide patents to other 
companies so that these companies can use the patents as defence weapons in case they are ever sued for patent 
infringement. In a similar vein, mass aggregators may also choose to license patents to small PAEs, which then 
enforce them against third parties. The existence of new types of PAE illustrates the fact that the ‘PAE 
environment’ is in a constant state of flux, with new business models emerging frequently. However, these 
business models are often of dubious transparency and may operate for motives which are difficult to anticipate. 
For these reasons it is difficult to draw general conclusions when analysing ‘trolling behaviour’ or when searching 
for the ‘average PAE’, something which is acknowledged below in the context of our methodology for 
identifying the PAEs in our dataset. 
While identifying PAEs can be a complex process, it is nonetheless clear that over the past decade the 
amount of court cases involving PAEs has exploded in the US. According to data from RPX, the number of 
cases increased from 499 in 2006 to 1,312 cases in 2011.37 Moreover, not only has the absolute number increased 
dramatically, court cases involving PAEs also account for a considerably larger share in the total number of 
patent court cases in the US. Chien suggests that the share almost doubled from 20% in 2000 to 36% in 2008.38 
The dramatic increase in the number of court cases implies that also the number of companies that are sued by 
PAEs in US courts has surged from around 580 in 2001 to over 5,000 in 2011.39 
While the empirical literature on litigation involving PAEs is growing, especially in the context of the US 
jurisdiction, there is little evidence on the overall economic impact of PAE litigation. One exception is the work 
of Tucker, who looks directly at the effect of assertion of patents by PAEs on sales and innovation by allegedly 
infringing companies. In particular, Tucker assesses the impact of a lawsuit filed by PAE Acacia in 2007 against 
13 producers of healthcare information technology.40 The case is in many ways representative of a typical troll 
lawsuit: Acacia acquired two patents from two independent inventors, who had not asserted the patent 
themselves, for the purpose of enforcing it afterwards in the court of Eastern District of Texas, an infamous 
location for PAE patent lawsuits. Tucker finds that the defendants suffered a considerable drop in sales during 
the trial. Furthermore, this drop cannot be explained by an equivalent drop in demand for the concerned 
software. Instead the evidence suggests the drop is due to a halt in innovation as the number of new software 
releases plummeted to zero during the lawsuit. Tucker’s research shows that PAE litigation can negatively affect 
producing entities regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit - the Acacia case for example eventually settled. It 
also helps explain the findings by Bessen et al. who find that alleged infringers experience a fall in their stock 
                                                     
36 T. Ewing and R. Feldman, ‘The Giants Among Us,’ Stanford Technology Law Review 1 (2012), 1-61; accessible at 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf.  
37 See http://www.rpxcorp.com/index.cfm?pageid=45. 
38 C. Chien, ‘Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents,’ North Carolina Law Review 
87 (2009), 1571-1615, at 1572. 
39 See https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/litigations/. 
40 C. Tucker, ‘Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion,’ TILEC Discussion Paper 2012-030 (2012); accessible at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2136955. 
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market price as a direct consequence of litigation taken against them by PAEs. Overall this fall in stock market 
value exceeds the revenues recovered by the litigating PAEs, implying a net social loss.41  
It is notable that even though PAEs litigate on a global basis, the majority of the available empirical evidence 
on litigation involving PAEs and their associated impact on innovation, including the results discussed above, is 
based on litigation before US courts.42 Indeed, while there has been some anecdotal evidence on the activity of 
PAEs outside of the US, empirical evidence has largely been missing.43 It is thus unclear whether patent trolls are 
largely confined to the US legal system or whether they pose similar challenges in other jurisdictions, notably the 
major European markets. It is necessary to consider the potential for similar surges in troll litigation to occur in 
European jurisdictions, and the UK in particular. However, the lack of available empirical evidence on PAE 
litigation in Europe, combined with concern over the potential negative impact of trolls upon innovation rates of 
European companies, has led to a great deal of uncertainty.44 With this in mind, over the course of section 3 we 
provide the first thorough empirical study of PAE litigation at the PHC. 
 
 
 
3. ASSESSING PAE LITIGATION BEFORE THE PHC 
 
As stated above, within the sphere of global patent litigation, numerous commentators recognise that the 
European patent system appears to contain specific features that make PAE litigation less lucrative.45 Notably, 
under the EPC system it is more difficult to obtain patents for software and business methods than it currently is 
under US law, which means that the problem of ‘over-broad’ patents with ‘fuzzy’ boundaries is less noticeable in 
Europe.46 In applying the EPC, the European Patent Office (EPO) and the UK courts will only accept a patent 
on a computer program or a business method invention if it has an appropriate ‘technical’ element.47 However, 
                                                     
41 J. Bessen, M. Meurer, and J. Ford, ‘The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls,’ Boston Univ. School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper 11-
45 (2011), 26-35. 
42 M. Risch, ‘Patent Troll Myths,’ Seton Hall Law Review 42 (2012), 457-499. 
43 Opitz and Pohlmann provide a brief case study of the litigation activity of two German PAEs, Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. Kg and IPCom 
GmbH. M. Opitz and T. Pohlmann, ‘The Patent Troll Business: An efficient Model to enforce IPR?’ (2010); accessible at 
http://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/documents/papers_EMAEE/pohlmann2.pdf. See also generally S. Subramanian, ‘Patent Trolls in Thickets: 
Who is Fishing Under the Bridge?,’ European Intellectual Property Review 30(5) (2008), 182-188, and S. Thambisetty, ‘SMEs and Patent Litigation: 
Policy-Based Evidence Making?,’ European Intellectual Property Review 32(4) (2010),  143-145. 
44 The lack of comparative data on patent litigation in Europe has been noted by P. Leith, Software and Patents in Europe (Cambridge, UK, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), at 185. 
45 A. Mayergoyz, ‘Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls,’ Cornell International Law Review 42 (2009), 241-270, at 257; S. J. 
Marsnik and R. E. Thomas, ‘Drawing a Line in the Patent-Subject Matter Sands: Does Europe Provide a Solution to the Software and Business 
Method Patent Problem,’ Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 34 (2011), 227-328, at 230-233. 
46 Article 52, European Patent Convention (EPC); accessible at http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2010/e/ma1.html. 
Patents Act 1977 section 1(2), corresponding to Article 52(2) EPC. See also A. Mayergoyz, ‘Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent 
Trolls,’ Cornell International Law Review 42 (2009), 241-270, at 258-259. 
47 For UK cases see Navitaire Inc v Easyjet Airline Co [2004] EWHC 1725 (Ch), Aerotel v Telco and Macrossan's application [2006] EWCA Civ 1371, 
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1371.html. See Case T 0208/84 - 3.5.1 and Symbian Limited v Comptroller General of 
Patents [2008] EWCA Civ 1066. For EPO cases see Vicom (1986) T0208/84 0.J. EPO 14, Pension Benefits (2000) T0931/95, Hitachi/Auction method 
(2004) T258/03 and Microsoft/Data transfer with expanded clipboard formats (2006) T0424/03.  
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the meaning of technical in this context is of uncertain definition,48 which means that software and business 
method patents are less strong and generally less prevalent in Europe than in the United States.49 
Another important reason why patent trolls are less prevalent in litigation in Europe is the absence, at 
present, of a unitary European patent. That is, once a patent has been granted by the EPO, it has to be validated 
into national patents at each national patent office. This in turn means that patents have to be enforced and 
invalidated in each EPC member state within which the patent is individually in force. The requirements of multi-
jurisdictional litigation has important consequences for the complexity and costs involved, while the potential 
reward may only be an injunction which is confined to the specific member state.50 From the perspective of a 
PAE, this may make undertaking litigation in Europe less attractive relative to the US. For this reason, given the 
fact that a Unified Patent Court (UPC) for Europe is on the horizon, some commentators have speculated 
whether this will have the effect of increasing or decreasing troll litigation.51 At this stage, given the fact that the 
details of the court’s make-up have not yet been decided, it is not possible to give a firm assessment of the 
potential impact of the UPC. However, by analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the PHC, we aim to 
demonstrate the characteristics of a patent enforcement system that limits potentially socially litigation by PAEs. 
 
3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM OF ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
Patent litigation at the PHC is guided by the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR).52 Although infringement cases filed by 
patent-holders are common, and may provoke a counter-claim for revocation, it is not unusual for claimants to 
file suit seeking the revocation of a patent. In such a case a defendant may choose to counter-claim for 
infringement. In the context of the ICT sector a third type of case might involve a party seeking to challenge the 
‘essentiality’ of a patented ‘standard’. In a case where patent infringement has been proven, the possible 
restitution measures which may be granted by the court can include a public declaration of the defendant’s 
infringement, an order for disclosure of information related to the allegedly infringing product, an injunction to 
stop the infringement, the delivery or destruction of infringing goods, the payment of damages, as well as the 
receipt of the relevant profits earned by the infringer.53 It is generally the case that an injunction may be stayed 
pending an appeal.54 Nonetheless, it is usually the case that the PHC will not grant a stay of its own proceedings 
pending foreign proceedings. In spite of this, the PHC will sometimes grant a stay with regard to EPO 
opposition proceedings, but only where the relevant circumstances require it. For example, as described below, in 
one case in our dataset involving a PAE, a stay was granted pending EPO opposition proceedings. 
Moreover, it is generally acknowledged that patent litigation before the PHC can be a lengthy process - cases 
filed before the PHC often take a year or more to make it to full trial.55 It is also often stated that litigation at the 
                                                     
48 See generally J. Pila, ‘Software  Patents, Separation of Powers and Failed Syllogisms: a Cornucopia from the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the 
European Patent Office,’ Cambridge Law Journal 70(1) (2011), 203-228; R. B. Bakels, ‘Software Patentability: What are the Right Questions?,’ 
European Intellectual Property Review 31(10) (2009), 514-522; D. Booton, ‘The Patentability of Computer-Implemented Inventions in Europe,’ 
Intellectual Property Quarterly 1 (2007), 92-116; and M. Likhovski, ‘Fighting Patent Wars,’ European Intellectual Property Review 23 (2001), 267-274. 
49 The first US case to recognise business method patents was State St. Bank & Trust Co. v Signature Fin. Group, Inc., (1998) 149 F.3d 1368, 1374-
1375 (Fed Cir. 1998). See also AT&T Corporation v Excel Communications, Inc., (1999) 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed Cir. 1999), In re Bilski 545 F.3d 
943, 88 USPQ 2d 1385 (2008) and Bilski v Kappos 000 U.S. 08-964 (2010). 
50 A. Mayergoyz, ‘Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls,’ Cornell International Law Review 42 (2009), 241-270, at 263-265. 
51 For an assessment of the pros and cons of the UPC see House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, The Unifed Patent Court – Help or 
Hindrance? (2012); accessible at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmeuleg/1799/1799vw.pdf.  
52 http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil.  
53 C. Greenhalgh, J. Philips, R. Pitkethly, M. Rogers, and J. Tomalin, ‘Intellectual Property Enforcement in Smaller UK Firms,’ Report for the 
Strategy Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy (SABIP) (2010), 1, 50; accessible at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-ipenforcement-
201010.pdf. 
54 Furthermore, pending appeal, an order for revocation is always stayed – Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, A Guide to Patent Litigation in 
Europe – England and Wales (2011) 3-4 (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP hereafter referred to as Freshfields).. 
55 Freshfields, A Guide to Patent Litigation in Europe – England and Wales (2011), 1-6..   
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PHC tends come at a ‘high cost’ for both claimants and defendants.56 In addition, some commentators argue that 
the UK courts tend to be ‘anti-patent’ – it is often suggested that patents tend to be invalidated more frequently 
before the PHC when compared to other courts in other jurisdictions.57 With respect to infringement cases, this 
view of the PHC might lead potential claimants, wary of having their patents invalidated, to seek to avoid 
litigation in the UK. On the other hand, potential defendants may regard the UK as a propitious jurisdiction for 
challenging the validity of patents and/or claiming non-infringement.58 With regard to the case outcomes and 
costs of patent litigation at the PHC, we validate these claims empirically in a companion paper using data on all 
patent cases filed at the Patents Court (PHC) from 2000 to 2008.59 In addition to our analysis of PAE lawsuits 
undertaken below, we also draw on these previous data where relevant. 
 
3.2 DATA SOURCE 
 
For our overall study, we assembled a dataset that contains all patent court cases at the PHC during the period 
2000-2008, a total of 255 cases.60 In this article we single out all cases, a total of 15, that involve a PAE, regardless 
of whether the PAE is the claimant or defendant. We have detailed information on the characteristics of the 
court cases, the parties involved and the litigated patents, which we obtained from the court records as well as a 
number of external databases. The appendix provides a detailed discussion of how we constructed our dataset. 
The analysis of litigation involving PAEs in the context of the UK is in many ways easier than in similar 
work on PAEs in the US. The main reason for this is that the number of litigants is significantly smaller, which 
allowed us to search manually for PAEs among all 580 litigants (claimants and defendants).  
As noted above, it is extremely difficult to definitely state that a certain entity is a PAE. Nonetheless, to 
undertake the requisite analysis there is a need to identify a broad area of ‘PAE litigation’. In order to examine the 
field of PAE litigation within our overall dataset, we utilised a list of 130 PAEs which was assembled based on 
the existing literature and databases. We also double checked any names in our list of litigating parties that we 
could not find in our list of PAEs but that we could not easily associate with R&D or some productive activity. 
By relying on the existing evidence to identify PAEs, we generally avoid having to take a definitive stance on 
whether a given company should be regarded as a PAE.  
On the basis of the materials available to us, we decided to include eight companies contained within our 
dataset under the framework of ‘PAE litigation’ - Rambus Inc., Document Security Systems, Gemstar TV Guide 
International Inc., Inpro Licensing, Interdigital Technology Corporation, IPcom Gmbh, Sisvel and Visto 
Corporation. Rambus Inc. and Gemstar were identified as PAEs by Fischer and Henkel.61 Goode has identified 
Document Security Systems as a PAE62 while McCurdy has noted that IPcom Gmbh is a PAE.63 Interdigital Inc. 
and Inpro Licensing were identified as PAEs by Shrestha.64  
                                                     
56 M. Burdon, ‘The UK: Can a High-Cost Country Change its Way?,’ WIPO Magazine (2010); K. Weatherall, E. Webster, and L. Bently, “IP 
Enforcement in the UK and Beyond: A Literature Review”, SABIP Report Number EC001 (2009), 1; accessible at 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-ipenforcement-200905.pdf.   
57 G. Moss, M. Jones, and R. Lundie-Smith, ‘Just How `Anti-Patent’ are the UK Courts?,’ Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 5 (2010), 
148-157, at 148. 
58 Ibid. 
59 C. Helmers and L. McDonagh, ‘Patent Litigation in the UK,’  LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 12/2012. 
60 For a detailed description of the data see C. Helmers and L. McDonagh, ‘Patent Litigation in the UK,’LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 12/2012. 
61 T. Fischer and J. Henkel, ‘Patent Trolls on Markets for Technology – An Empirical Analysis of Trolls’ Patent Acquisitions,’ 
Working Paper (2011), 1-36, at 30; accessible at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1523102.  
62 M. Goode, ‘Document Security Systems: Nothing But A Patent Troll’ (2007); accessible at 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/45256-document-security-systems-nothing-but-a-patent-troll; See also ‘DMC: A Long History of 
Silly, Fruitless Litigation,’ (2006); accessible at http://www.asensio.com/Data/Pdfs/717.pdf  
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We took care to exclude potential examples of ‘PAE litigation’ where we thought it appropriate. Within our 
list, Sisvel is an interesting example as it was created out of a pool of patents on behalf of innovative companies 
including Philips and France Telecom.65 As such this case represents an example of a newer type of ‘PAE 
litigation’. Furthermore, Cook and Bevan argue convincingly that Sisvel is indeed a PAE.66  
Our data also include a case that involves Qualcomm Corporation, which some have argued may share some 
of the characteristics of a PAE.67 However, Qualcomm’s case does not fall into our understanding of ‘PAE 
litigation’ and thus, is excluded. One reason for this is that the specific case in our database involves two patents 
on mobile telephony that were invented by Qualcomm.68 Another reason is that in our study of the literature we 
found little or no reference to Qualcomm being involved in PAE litigation. 
Visto (known as Good Inc. since March 2009) is a software company that, in addition to patent licensing, 
also performs innovative research and development.69 Therefore, it is not a non-producing entity or patent troll. 
Nonetheless, we include the cases involving RIM and Visto70 in our analysis of PAE litigation. There are several 
reasons for considering the disputes between these companies in our analysis. First, Visto established a direct link 
to a known non-practicing entity, NTP, shortly before Visto commenced litigation against RIM. At the time, 
NTP was already engaged in a protracted lawsuit against RIM which ended in a US$ 612.5 million settlement in 
March 2006 in NTP’s favour.71 Not long before the settlement, in December 2005, NTP acquired an equity stake 
in Visto and entered a licensing agreement under which NTP licensed patents to Visto.72 Shortly thereafter, in 
May 2006, Visto sued RIM in the US for infringement of four patents related to wireless data transmission.73 The 
case followed earlier infringement suits against Microsoft, Seven Networks, and Good Technology.74 In fact, at 
this stage Visto has a rather lengthy history of patent assertions,75 which is another reason to characterise cases 
brought by Visto within the category of ‘PAE litigation’. Third, Visto received capital investment of US$35 
million from Altitude Capital Partner, a company which specializes in IP monetization, in early 2007 - while still 
engaged in the lawsuit with RIM.76 The existence of factors such as the link with NTP, the equity investment by 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
63 D. P. McCurdy, ‘Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation of the U.S. Patent System,’ Science Progress 1 (2009) 78, at 82. 
64 S. K. Shrestha, ‘Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities,’ Columbia Law Review 110 (2010), 
114-160, at 160; accessible at http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/pdfs/110/1/Shrestha.pdf.  
65 S. Subramanian, 186. 
66 W. Cook and D. Bevan, ‘The Ultimate Leverage Tacticians,’ Managing Intellectual Property 5 (2007). 
67 http://www.decryptedtech.com/editorials/qualcomms-split-for-protection-or-aggression 
68 Qualcomm Incorporated v Nokia Corporation [2008] EWHC 329 (Pat); [2008] EWHC 777 (Ch). 
69 Visto created push email services for mobile devices and a browser-based application suite. 
70 Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto Corporation; Visto Corporation v Research in Motion & Anor [2007] EWHC 900 (Ch); [2007] EWHC 
1921 (Pat); [2007] Info. TLR 325; [2008] EWHC 335 (Pat); [2008] Bus. LR D89; [2008] EWHC 819 (Pat); stay application 
appealed to Court of Appeal [2008] EWCA Civ 153; [2008] 2 All ER (Comm) 560 (cases HC06C03912 & HC06C042270). Research 
in Motion UK Ltd v Visto Corp; Visto Corp v Research in Motion UK Ltd & Anor [2008] EWHC 3025 (Pat); [2008] EWHC 3026 (Pat). 
US cases were also taken, but there was a worldwide settlement between the parties in 2009; details accessible at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ax7YieZI0gy0 and 
http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/publications/Northern-District-of-California/RIM_v_Visto_NDCA_07cv3177_2-26-2008.pdf 
71 http://press.blackberry.com/press/2006/pressrelease-981.html 
72 http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/visto-and-ntp-sign-patent-licensing-agreement-55539132.html; 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-12-14/ntp-sticks-it-to-rim 
73 The patents are: US6023708, US6085192, US6708221, and US6151606. http://news.cnet.com/2100-1039_3-
6066898.html?part=rss&tag=6066898&subj=news 
74 http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/visto-files-legal-action-against-microsoft-for-misuse-of-vistos-proprietary-
technology-55546717.html; http://news.cnet.com/Good-Technology-hit-with-wireless-e-mail-patent-suit/2100-1014_3-
6033319.html 
75 http://patentexaminer.org/2012/01/visto-longtime-patent-litigant-kicks-off-2012-with-a-new-patent-suit 
76 http://www.altitudecp.com/portfolio.html; http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20070219/012917.shtml; 
http://www.pehub.com/590/take-visto-out-of-deadpool; http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/visto-corporation-secures-
35-million-in-financing-from-altitude-capital-partners-57958367.html; http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2007/0507/044.html 
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Altitude Capital, and its track record of patent lawsuits has led some commentators to place Visto’s litigious 
behaviour within the field of ‘PAE litigation’.77 Therefore, although it is clear that Visto cannot be categorized as 
a NPE,78 in our view there are sound arguments to include the Rim v Visto case in our set of PAE cases. This 
said, the case serves to illustrate the difficulty in classifying companies as PAEs – where this is not 
unambiguously possible, the object of analysis has to be at the case-level and the decision ultimately requires 
some subjective judgment. 
In addition to detailed information concerning the court cases and patents involved in the 15 cases that 
involve PAEs, for comparative value our study also uses detailed information on all other patent cases before the 
PHC, as well as of comparative patents which have not been involved in litigation. The appendix describes these 
additional data in more detail. 
 
3.3 PAE CASES 
 
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of the 15 court cases that involve PAEs filed before the PHC 
between 2000 and 2008. We discuss the characteristics of these cases at three levels: at the level of the court case, 
at the level of the individual patents involved in the cases and at the level of the litigating parties.  
With respect to the court cases, Table 1 provides an overview. It lists all 15 cases, the claimants, defendants, 
the claim at issue, the outcome of the case, and the year in which the case was lodged. The table shows that there 
has been no clear-cut increase in PAE litigation over time. While it is true that there was only a single PAE case 
filed in 2000, whereas there were seven cases filed in 2008, five of these seven cases revolved around the same 
dispute between Nokia and IPCom (see discussion below). Moreover, no new case was filed in 2007. In contrast, 
in 2006 there were four cases involving four different PAEs and two such cases in 2005. This means that while 
the number of cases increased after 2003, there was no continued increase in court cases involving PAEs. 
The first case, which involved two joined applications heard as one case,79 Rambus v Micron and Rambus v 
Hyundai, Rambus claimed infringement and sought an injunction, damages and delivery up with respect to an 
invention in the area of semiconductor technology featuring Rambus’ European patent. The defendants 
counterclaimed for revocation. The PHC case was stayed subject to the outcome of a related EPO hearing on the 
validity of the relevant patent. The EPO subsequently revoked the patent and in 2004 the PHC apportioned costs 
between the parties as described below.80 
In a long running dispute81 between Nokia Corporation, the well-known mobile phone manufacturer, and 
Interdigital, a PAE, multiple patents belonging to each party were in dispute over the course of three cases. The 
                                                     
77 V. E. Luxardo, ‘Towards a solution to the problem of illegitimate patent enforcement practices in the United States: an equitable 
affirmative defense of “Fair Use” in patent. Emory International Law Review Vol. 20(2) (2006), 791,at 805; see also. 
http://righttocreate.blogspot.com/2006/05/why-patent-trolls-win.html; http://mcguireslaw.com/2006/05/22/is-qualcomm-
just-like-ntpvisto; http://allantyoung.com/2008/07/01/patent-bridge-bridge-is-falling-down;  
78 http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2006/06/visto_another_m.html 
79 Rambus Inc v Micron Europe Ltd/Rambus Inc v Hyundai Electronics UK Ltd, Laddie J., December 19, 2000 (unreported). 
80 Rambus Inc v Hynix Semiconductor UK Ltd and another [2004] EWHC 2313 (Pat); [2004] All ER (D) 587 (Jul). Hynix Semiconductor UK Limited 
was previously known as Hyundai Electronics UK Limited. Although the EPO annulled the patent in Europe, the parties proceeded to have 
later disputes in the US with regard to patents and competition law, with Rambus losing both actions in May 2011 (patent) and November 2011 
(antitrust) – accessible at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/court-vacates-rambus-patent-case-win-vs-hynix-2011-05-13;  
http://www.crowell.com/PDF/2011-05-13-Micron-v-Rambus-Fed-Cir.pdf;   
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/us-rambus-micron-verdict-idUSTRE7AF1XL20111116.  
81 Nokia Corporation v Interdigital Technology Corporation; Interdigital Technology Corporation v Nokia Corporation [2006] EWHC 759 (Pat); [2006] EWHC 
802 (Pat); [2007] EWHC 3077 (Pat); [2008] EWHC 504 (Pat); [2008] EWHC 969 (Pat); on appeal to Court of Appeal - [2006] EWCA Civ 1618 
(cases HC05C02026 & HC06C04422 which were heard together in one hearing, but split apart in other hearings). See also earlier case of 
HC04C01952 - stay application hearings in Nokia Corporation v Interdigital Technology Corporation [2004] EWHC 2920 (Pat); stay application on 
appeal to Court of Appeal - [2005] EWCA Civ 614 – this case eventually settled. 
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first case, in which Nokia sought revocation of three of Interdigital’s patents, was settled -- only stay applications 
were heard by the PHC and CA.82 Following this, during 2005 Nokia took a second case to have the PHC declare 
29 of Interdigital’s patents as non-essential to the third generation mobile telecommunications standard in 
Europe (3G UMTS). The number of patents in suit was eventually whittled down to four patents by the time of 
the PHC judgment,83 which granted to Nokia declarations of non-essentiality for three out of four patents. The 
PHC held that only claim six of the remaining patent would be infringed. In December 2006 Interdigital filed suit 
in the third case which it undertook against Nokia with respect to the alleged non-essentiality of 35 of Nokia's 
patents regarding the 3G UMTS. The series of cases was eventually settled during 2008.84 Unfortunately we 
possess no information on the terms of the settlement agreement.85 
In the 2006 case of Research in Motion v Inpro86 (a case which T-Mobile joined as Part 20 defendants87) the 
facts concerned a patent on a hand-held, or 'field', computer featuring a small display which could access the 
Internet. The PHC and the Court of Appeal held the patent invalid on the ground of obviousness.88 
In Sandisk v Koninklijke Philips,89 another case which arose during 2006, one of the defendants was Sisvel,90 an 
Italian PAE set up by the other defendants -- Philips, France Telecom, IRT, and TDF -- to hold a pool of patents 
related to MPEG audio technology, and MP3 players in particular. Sisvel claimed that four of its patents were 
essential to the manufacture of Sandisk’s MP3 audio players. However, Sandisk refused Sisvel’s offer of a licence 
for the use of the patents. Following this refusal, Sisvel then attempted to enforce the patents by utilising the 
European Border Detention Regulation to block the import of Sandisk’s MP3 audio products into the EU. At 
the High Court Sandisk took both an action alleging breach of competition law and an action relating to Sisvel’s 
patents. Only the patent action is relevant to our study.91 With regard to the patent issues the PHC gave 
judgment on 4 initial applications - it struck out Sandisk’s case seeking a declaration that the 4 patents were ‘non-
essential’ to MP3 players, ordered Sandisk to disclose product descriptions of its MP3 players, ordered a separate 
trial of the defendants' application to amend one of its patents, and allowed Sandisk to amend its grounds of 
invalidity to plead that the invention was not patentable. However, the case did not reach a full trial hearing at the 
PHC because Sandisk eventually settled and took a licence from Sisvel.92 
The case of European Central Bank v Document Security Systems93 represents another case where the validity of a 
PAE’s patent was challenged before the PHC. Document Security Systems (DDS) is a PAE which holds patents 
                                                     
82 Nokia Corporation v Interdigital Technology Corporation [2004] EWHC 2920 (Pat); stay application on appeal to Court of Appeal - [2005] EWCA Civ 
614. 
83 Nokia Corporation v Interdigital Technology Corporation [2007] EWHC 3077 (Pat). 
84 The settlement was noted in The EE Times (J. Walko, ‘Nokia, InterDigital settle some IP disputes,’ 7 Feburary 2008); accessible at 
http://www.eetimes.com/electronics-news/4192537/Nokia-InterDigital-settle-some-IP-disputes.  
85 The parties settled with regard to UK proceedings, but cases between the same parties continue in the US as of August 2012 – see 
http://www.intomobile.com/2008/07/07/nokia-and-interdigital-settle-patent-case-in-uk/;  
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-08-01/interdigital-wins-u-dot-s-dot-appeal-in-patent-fight-with-nokia.  
86 Research in Motion UK Ltd v Inpro Licensing SARL ( v (i) Research in Motion UK Limited (ii) T-Mobile (UK) Limited (Part 20 defendants) [2006] 
EWHC 70 (Pat); on appeal [2007] EWCA Civ 51. 
87 Part 20 defendants are defendants who are brought into the case via a counter claim – in this case the counter claim was made by Inpro for 
infringement against both RIM and T-Mobile. See http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/pd_part20.  
88 Inpro sought to enforce their patent across the EC, but was unsuccessful in another action brought in the German Court in Munich where 
their German patent was invalidated. There is also a US case which found no infringement; accessible at 
http://press.rim.com/newsroom/press/2006/pressrelease-1041.html  and http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-federal-circuit/1058146.html  
http://www.kirkland.com/files/Inpro_II.pdf.  
89 Sandisk Corporation v Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., France Télécom S.A., TDF, Institut Für Rundfunktechnik GmbH, Societa Italiana Per Lo 
Svilluppo Dell'Elettronica S.P.A. [2006] EWHC 3100 (Pat). 
90 Società Italiana per lo Sviluppo dell’Elettronica spa. 
91 With regard to the competition law action, the PHC granted judgment in favour of defendants - it held it had no jurisdiction to determine the 
substantive competition law-based claim. Sandisk Corporation v Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., France Télécom S.A., TDF, Institut Für 
Rundfunktechnik GmbH, Societa Italiana Per Lo Svilluppo Dell'Elettronica S.P.A. [2007] EWHC 332 (Ch). 
92 Case was settled but financial terms not disclosed - http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2007/03/12/daily71.html. See also S. 
Subramanian, ‘Patent Trolls in thickets: Who is Fishing Under the Bridge?,’ European Intellectual Property Review 30(5), (2008), 182-188, at 186.  
93 European Central Bank v Document Security Systems Inc [2007] EWHC 600 (Pat); [2008] EWCA Civ 192. 
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related to banknote anti-counterfeiting technology. The DDS patent was ultimately held to be invalid by the PHC 
in 2007 due to the issue of added matter, a ruling which was upheld by the Court of Appeal in 2008.94 
During 2008, judgment was granted in RIM v Visto by the PHC in favour of RIM. The PHC ruled that the 
Visto patent was invalid. Nevertheless, Visto “won” on the issue of infringement – the PHC stated that had the 
patent been valid it would have been infringed. Furthermore, following a counterclaim by Visto, RIM conceded 
that two of its patents were invalid.95 A later case taken by RIM to revoke three of Visto’s divisional patents, with 
Visto counterclaiming to revoke four RIM patents, was settled.96 
The 2009 PHC case of Gemstar v Virgin97 related to three of Gemstar's European patents, which covered 
various aspects of electronic programme guides (EPGs) for TV set top boxes. In 2009, the PHC found that all 
three patents were invalid for a variety of reasons including excluded subject matter, lack of novelty and lack of 
inventive step. In 2011 the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the PHC.98 
Another example in our dataset saw a PAE, IPCom, engage in a series of five cases99 with Nokia during 
hearings in 2009 and 2010.100 Nokia sought revocation of IPCom's patents101 before the PHC. IPCom responded 
by alleging infringement by Nokia concerning the same patents. Four out of five of the cases settled. With regard 
to the case which did proceed to judgment, both the PHC and the Court of Appeal held that two of IPCom’s 
patents were invalid - one for obviousness and one for lack of novelty and obviousness. The two parties have 
continued to litigate against each other, with the most recent case decided in February 2012.102 However, these 
later cases fall outside our dataset because they were filed post-2008. Nonetheless, the existence of recent cases, 
notwithstanding earlier settlements, illustrates the complexity at the heart of PAE litigation, as well as potentially 
ongoing nature of, these types of cases. 
Regarding general conclusions on the subject of PAEs, there were in total 15 patent cases filed during the 
period 2000-2008, a relatively small number. Eight PAEs were involved – Rambus, Interdigtal, Visto, Inpro, 
IPCom, DDS, Gemstar and Sisvel. Strikingly, in most cases the revocation of the PAE’s patents was sought – 
only two out of the 15 cases involved an initial infringement claim at the PHC by a PAE (the cases filed by 
Rambus and Gemstar). On the other hand, eleven cases were filed seeking to revoke the patent(s) held by PAEs 
– see Table 2. One additional case was filed seeking to declare the PAE patents non-essential to the relevant 
industry standard and one more was filed by a PAE to declare a producing company’s patents non-essential (both 
cases were part of the Nokia v Interdigital dispute).  
                                                     
94 ECB also filed claims to invalidate the Patent in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Spain, Luxembourg, and Belgium, in an 
attempt to completely invalidate the patent in all nine jurisdictions. To date, the Patent has been held to be valid in Germany. 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Document+Security+Systems+to+Move+Forward+with+Infringement+Suit+vs....-a0172571704;   
http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2010/12/22/ecb-cashes-in-at-dutch-coa-dss%E2%80%99-patent-revoked/.  
95 Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto Corporation; Visto Corporation v Research in Motion & Anor [2007] EWHC 900 (Ch); [2007] EWHC 1921 (Pat); 
[2008] EWHC 335 (Pat); [2008] EWHC 819 (Pat); stay application appealed to Court of Appeal [2008] EWCA Civ 153 (cases HC06C03912 & 
HC06C042270).  
96 Research in Motion UK Ltd v Visto Corp; Visto Corp v Research in Motion UK Ltd & Anor [2008] EWHC 3025 (Pat); [2008] EWHC 3026 (Pat). US 
cases were taken as well, but there was a worldwide settlement between the parties in 2009; accessible at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ax7YieZI0gy0;   
http://www.fr.com/files/uploads/publications/Northern-District-of-California/RIM_v_Visto_NDCA_07cv3177_2-26-2008.pdf. 
97 Gemstar- Tvguide International Inc & Ors v Virgin Media Ltd & Anor [2009] EWHC 3068 (Ch); [2009] EWHC 3552 (Pat). 
98 Gemstar- Tvguide International Inc & Ors v Virgin Media Ltd & Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 302. 
99 Although 6 cases were field, 2 were joined and heard as one case – we count this as one case in our dataset. 
100 Nokia GMBH v IPCom GmbH & Co KG; IPCom GMBH & Co KG v Nokia UK Limited; Nokia OYJ (Nokia Corporation) [2009] EWHC 3482 
(Pat); [2010] EWHC 789 (Pat); [2010] EWHC 790 (Pat); on appeal [2011] EWCA Civ 6. 
101 We are grateful to Bird & Bird LLP for providing us with the patent numbers for this case. The relevant numbers were not listed in the court 
records available to us. 
102 Nokia and IPCom are still engaged in litigation before the UK courts as of Feb 2012:Nokia OYJ v IPCOM GMBH & Co KG [2011] EWHC 
1470 (Pat) - HC10 C01233 and Nokia GMBH v IPCOM GMBH & Co. KG [2012] EWHC 225 (Pat) - HC09 C04868.There have also been recent 
cases in Germany http://www.ipeg.eu/?p=2445;   
http://www.electronista.com/articles/12/04/25/epo.revokes.patent.from.ipcom.for.3g.connections/.  
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Six PAE cases end with a full judgment by the PHC, with one further judgment acknowledging the outcome 
of EPO proceedings. The corresponding case outcomes are striking: only with respect to one minor issue in a 
single case, during the dispute between Nokia and Interdigital, was infringement found by the court, and this was 
in the context of a case where three other PAE patents were found to be non-essential and not infringed. 
Instead, in five cases the patents were revoked by the UK courts. In addition, the patent in dispute in the Rambus 
v Micron and Rambus v Hyundai case that was stayed at the PHC was revoked by the EPO.  When the UK and 
EPO rulings are taken together, there is an overall revocation rate of 85% for cases that ended with a 
judgment.103 This figure is substantially larger than the numbers found for court cases in the US involving PAEs. 
Risch (2012) for example finds an invalidation rate of 28% of PAE cases that ended with a judgement on merits 
while Shresta (2011) only finds 16% of PAE patent cases to end with the invalidation of a PAE patent. 
Nevertheless, in eight cases out of 15 cases the outcome was a settlement, which most likely involved a 
payment to the PAE in each case (as in the settlement involving Sandisk and Sisvel). 104 However, of these eight 
cases which were settled, four were effectively part of the same long-running dispute between Nokia and IPCom 
and another two were part of the dispute between Nokia and Interdigital.  Therefore, if cumulative ‘disputes’ 
between parties rather than individual cases are examined, we find that four out of eight disputes between PAE 
cases and other companies ended with a settlement. 
Interestingly, with respect to the five Nokia v IPCom cases and the three Nokia v Interdigital cases in our 
dataset, in each saga the PHC issued one ruling. In Nokia v IPCom, two IPcom patents were revoked by the PHC, 
while In Nokia v Interdigital, three out of four Interdigital patents were declared non-essential and non-infringed. 
With respect to both of these sagas, it is possible that these rulings, which largely went against the PAEs, were 
influential on the eventual settlement agreements and would suggest settlements in favour of Nokia rather than 
the PAEs.  
Table 2 compares the claims in the PAE cases summarised above with the population of patent cases filed at 
the PHC during 2000-2008. In the population of cases, the most frequent claim is for the infringement of a 
patent (45%), whereas in PAE cases, as discussed above, by far the most frequent claim is for the revocation of a 
patent (73%). This suggests that companies may proactively attempt to invalidate patents owned by PAEs in the 
UK. Similarly, it is possible that a company, having already been targeted by a PAE in another jurisdiction, may 
make the strategic decision to use litigation before the PHC of England and Wales in order to invalidate in the 
UK the equivalent of the PAE patents asserted against the company in the other jurisdiction.  
Regarding the case outcomes, Table 3 shows that for the 240 non-PAE cases during 2000-2008, by far the 
most likely outcome is the revocation of a patent regardless of the claim of the action (revocation occurs in 25% 
of infringement cases and 43% of revocation cases). The total absolute numbers are considerably lower for PAE 
cases; hence a 50% revocation rate for infringement claims should be interpreted with caution. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note that all revocation cases ended either with the invalidation of a patent or a settlement - four 
out of 11 revocation cases (36%) ended with the invalidation of a patent by the PHC and the remainder settled. 
This means that revocation is the most likely outcome of a judgment at the PHC regardless of whether the case 
involves a PAE or not. Further to this, it is striking that the settlement rate for revocation claims is considerably 
larger in cases that involve PAEs than in the population of patent cases. In addition, regarding appeals for all 
non-PAE cases during 2000-2008, from our analysis105 we know that about a third of all non-PAE cases 
proceeded to the Court of Appeal, where in 80% of cases the judgment of the PHC was upheld. Regarding 
                                                     
103 This finding disagrees with Hosie’s claim that PAEs do not enforce weak patents. S. Hosie, ‘Patent Trolls and the New Tort Reform: A 
Practitioner’s Perspective,’ A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 4  (2008), 75-87. 
104 The settlement was noted by Sisvel on its website - http://www.sisvel.eu/index.php/sisvel-news/160-sisvel-and-audio-mpeg-grant-sandisk-
an-mpeg-audio-patents-license. See also Silicon Valley/San Jose Business Journal (‘SanDisk, Sisvel settle patent dispute,’ 16 March 2007); accessible at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/stories/2007/03/12/daily71.html.  
105 This is established in a companion paper C. Helmers and L. McDonagh, ‘Patent Litigation in the UK,’ LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers 12/2012. 
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appeals in PAE cases, 100% of the initial decisions of the PHC were upheld by the CA, though this statistic also 
reflects the fact that only a small number of PAE cases were appealed from the PHC to the CA. Overall the high 
rate of invalidation of patents at the PHC would probably discourage PAE litigation. 
In light of the high likelihood of revocation of patents owned by PAEs, it is worth taking a closer look at the 
litigated patents and considering whether the patents concerned are of particularly low quality. Figure 1 plots the 
age (measured as the difference between the priority date of a patent and the beginning of the law suit) 
distributions of the patents in dispute in the 15 PAE cases and those in the other 240 cases heard by the PHC 
between 2000 and 2008.106 The figure shows that neither patents aged ≤5 years nor >20 years are involved in 
PAE disputes. Most of the patents in PAE lawsuits are either between six and ten years or 16 and 20 years old, 
whereas in the population of court cases, most patents are between six and 15 years old. In any case, this 
evidence suggests that these patents have been visible to potential infringers for a substantial amount of time. By 
this rationale, it is logical to conclude that any uncertainty concerning the protected technologies ought to have 
disappeared by the time the patents are enforced.107 
As noted above, the available evidence in the existing literature suggests that patents asserted by PAEs tend 
to be overwhelmingly ICT related, with most patents covering inventions in the areas of telecommunication and 
digital communication.108 Figures 2 and 3 confirm that the patents involved in the PAE High Court cases are 
overwhelmingly concentrated in the ICT sector. This is significant because, as described above, ICT patents have 
certain distinctive characteristics which make them attractive to trolls. The PHC data provide a particularly 
striking illustration of the concentration of patents involved in PAE litigation in ICT because overall the majority 
of the cases in the population of lawsuits heard by the PHC during 2000-2008 involve pharmaceutical patents. 
Hence, while pharmaceutical patents represent the largest share of patents in the population of PHC cases 
generally, there is not a single patent protecting chemical or pharmaceutical inventions found within our set of 
PAE cases. Figure 3 breaks down the technologies protected by the patents involved in the 15 PAE lawsuits. 
Little surprisingly, most patents protect inventions concerning the transmission of digital content. 
In addition, regarding the quality of PAE patents, it is acknowledged that directly assessing ‘patent quality’ is 
difficult.109 Instead of attempting to qualitatively assess PAE patents individually, in our study we indirectly assess 
quality by measuring patent value. We do this because patent quality and value are positively correlated,110 
therefore by comparing the value of the patents involved in the PAE suits with other litigated and non-litigated 
patents, we can gain some insights as to the overall quality of the patents. Table 3 compares the PAE patents 
with set of control patents. We measure patent value by a range of metrics established in the literature, including 
forward citations, references to prior art in form of patents (backward citations) and the non-patent literature, the 
size of the patent family, the number of inventors, and the number of different IPC subclasses as a rough 
measure of patent breadth. The comparison with the overall population of litigated patents suggests that the 
patents involved in PAE lawsuits do not differ in a statistically significant way for all value metrics, except for 
                                                     
106 The set of patents involved in PAE cases excludes the 35 patents owned by Nokia whose standard essentiality was contested by Interdigital. 
107 However, Appendix Table 1 serves as a note of caution with regard to the `visibility’ of the patents as more than half of all patents do not 
show the PAE as the legal owner in EPO’s Espacenet online database (http://worldwide.espacenet.com). 
M. Reitzig, J. Henkel, and F. Schneider, ‘Collateral Damage for R&D manufacturers: How Patent Sharks Operate in Markets for Technology,’ 
Industrial and Corporate Change 19 (2010), 947-967.  
109 Definitions in the legal literature regard patent quality as the degree to which a granted patent satisfies the legal patentability requirements at a 
given patent office and is likely to withstand invalidity proceedings in court or before an administrative body – see R. P. Wagner, ‘Understanding 
Patent-Quality Mechanisms,’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 157 (2009), 2135-2173; and S. W. Graf, ‘Improving Patent Quality through 
Identification of Relevant Prior Art: Approaches to Increase Information Flow to the Patent Office,’, Lewis & Clark Law Review 11 (2007), 495-
519. This suggests that the quality of a given patent could be measured by the outcome of an infringement/invalidation suit. However, this 
approach is of limited in use in this context because we are interested in assessing whether a given patent that has been invalidated was indeed of 
low quality.  
110 Patent value is determined by a larger set of factors than patent quality - see discussion in footnote 95 above. 
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backward citations and the number of IPC subclasses. Patents involved in PAE cases tend to have fewer 
backward citations, which may indicate that they are less derivative of existing technologies. In contrast, they tend 
to cover a larger number of IPC subclasses, which may be an indication that they tend to be broader. 
Nevertheless, this seems to suggest that these patents are not of obviously less value, and therefore of less quality, 
than the average litigated patent before the PHC. However, we know that most patents that are litigated before 
the PHC protect pharmaceutical inventions, which may imply that this is the wrong comparison. In order to 
strengthen our comparison, we draw a control sample of patents which protect similar ICT technologies that 
have not been involved in litigation.111 The results are striking: the lower panel in Table 4 suggests that these 
litigated patents are of higher value than those not litigated according to all value metrics (except for the number 
of inventors).  
Therefore, two primary conclusions emerge from our comparisons at the patent-level. Firstly, according to 
our value metrics, patents asserted by PAEs are not significantly different from the average patent involved in 
lawsuits before the PHC between 2000 and 2008. This is interesting especially because we know that the patents 
involved in PAE disputes protect mostly inventions on digital data transmission whereas most of the other 
litigated patents are on pharmaceutical compounds and processes. Secondly, these patents are nevertheless more 
valuable than non-litigated patents that protect similar ICT inventions. This indicates that PAEs judiciously select 
the patents that they enforce within the set of ICT patents potentially available to them.112 Still, if it is true that 
the patents involved in PAE litigation are more valuable, and therefore of greater quality, than comparable non-
litigated patents, the fact that there is nonetheless still a high likelihood of their revocation by the PHC is 
surprising.  
Finally, we have a closer look at the firms involved in litigation with PAEs and compare them to other firms 
that were involved in patent litigation albeit not involving a PAE. Table 5 compares the distribution of 
companies involved in PAE cases with the population of companies involved in lawsuits before the PHC 
between 2000 and 2008.113 The table shows that two thirds of the 12 companies (see Appendix Table A2)114 that 
engaged in a lawsuit with a PAE are in the high-tech industry. Two companies are in the telecommunication 
sector, which are telecom companies T-Mobile and Nokia Siemens Networks. Another two companies are 
classified in the “Other Services” and “Business Services” categories, which are the Virgin Media companies. The 
distribution reflects the striking difference with the population of court cases already pointed out at the patent 
level: there are no pharmaceutical or chemical companies involved in litigation with PAEs whereas in the 
population of court cases, pharmaceutical and chemical companies account for around a third of litigating parties. 
In contrast, there are relatively fewer telecommunication and high-tech companies in the population of litigants. 
 
3.4 ASSESSING THE COSTS OF PATENT LITIGATION FOR PAES 
 
It is generally acknowledged that the costs of taking a patent case at the PHC are substantial.115 Regarding 
specific cost sums, from the available data on all patent cases at the PHC during the period 2000-2008 we 
                                                     
111 We draw a random sample of control patents that share the same priority year, authority, and IPC subclasses with the litigated PAE patents. 
112 This is confirmed by case studies, see for example M. Opitz and T. Pohlmann, `The Patent Troll Business: An efficient Model to enforce 
IPR?’ (2010), accessible at http://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/documents/papers_EMAEE/pohlmann2.pdf. 
113 We were unable to find SIC codes for 11 out of 538 registered companies (i.e. 2%). 
114 This comparison omits the European Central Bank. 
115 Jackson L.J., Civil Litigation Costs Review: Final Report (December 2009), 248-257; accessible at http://www.ciarb.org/information-and-
resources/2010/01/22/Review%20of%20Civil%20Litigation%20Costs%20Final%20Report.pdf. See also K. Weatherall, E. Webster, and L. 
Bently, IP Enforcement in the UK and Beyond: A Literature Review (2009), at 40; accessible at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-ipenforcement-
200905.pdf. J. Phillips, ‘IP Litigation, the New Money-Spinner,’ Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 1(8) (2006), 497. 
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estimate that the costs, encompassing both sides’ expenses, of a full trial at the PHC can amount to between 
£1million and £6million.116  
Moreover, it is important to note that in England and Wales the substantive legal issues and the issues of 
costs and damages are dealt with separately. In addition, under CPR section 44 the unsuccessful party is required 
to pay the other party’s costs. However, in the context of patent litigation, it is often the case that this rule is not 
strictly applied.117 Nonetheless, as a general rule it is the case that the successful party will recover about two-
thirds of its legal fees, depending on how the issues were won and lost.118 However, not all cases proceed, post-
trial, to a full hearing on costs - cost issues are often settled between the parties.119 For this reason, it is often the 
case that there are no court records available regarding the specific amount of costs and damages allotted to each 
side in each case. Consequently, the analysis of the costs data for PAEs undertaken here is based upon an 
evaluation of the records which are available.  
As noted above, following two joined applications,120 Rambus v Micron and Rambus v Hyundai, the patent 
actions were stayed subject to the outcome of a related EPO hearing, which subsequently revoked Rambus’ 
patent. Following the EPO ruling, the PHC assessed the costs payable to the defendants. Micron’s costs were 
estimated at £698,000 while Hynix’s (previously known as Hyundai Electronics) costs were noted at £233,000. 
The PHC stated that Rambus was liable for both defendants’ costs but did not make a ruling on the overall 
amount payable to each by Rambus. However, Rambus was ordered to pay £125,000 to each defendant as 
interim costs resulting from the stay.121Regarding the costs of cases involving PAEs, the PHC case of Gemstar v 
Virgin is of note. The PHC conducted a hearing on cost allocation. The PHC heard that the defendants’ costs up 
and including the High Court judgment, after an 11 day hearing, were estimated at £2.4 million, while the 
claimants’ costs were estimated at £1.9 million. Regarding the substantive issues of the PHC case, Virgin won 
most issues, crucially on the invalidity of the patents, and only lost on a small number of minor prior art issues. 
Consequently, the PHC projected that there should be a 13.5% costs deduction. Therefore 86.5% of Virgin's 
costs ought to be payable by Gemstar to Virgin (86.5% of £2.4 million is £2,076,000).  
At the high end of the costs scale, the costs arising from the joined cases involving RIM and Visto are of 
note. The PHC trial lasted six days, though there were a number of other applications and hearings throughout 
the saga, including a CA hearing regarding a stay application which lasted one day. At the costs allocation hearing, 
the PHC stated that the costs of the case ought to be divided proportionate to the issues won at trial. In this 
respect, the PHC stated that Visto ought to pay RIM 66% of RIM's total assessed costs and RIM ought to pay 
Visto 51% of Visto's total assessed costs. However, RIM's costs were estimated at nearly £6 million while Visto’s 
costs were estimated at £1.6 million. The PHC acknowledged that there was a great disparity between the cost 
levels of each side, but declined to place a cap on costs.  
As stated above, a series of cases occurred which involved a PAE, IPCom, and Nokia. At a costs allocation 
hearing in 2010 the PHC stated that it was clear that Nokia had won on most of the substantive issues, mainly 
concerning the invalidity of two patents, during the 11-day trial. With regard to the series of cases, the PHC heard 
that Nokia's costs had reached £1.3 million by the end of January 2010, whereas IPCom's had reached 
                                                     
116 We substantiate this claim in a companion paper C. Helmers and L. McDonagh,‘Patent Litigation in the UK,’ LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 12/2012. The figure is in line with Freshfields, A Guide to Patent Litigation in Europe – England and Wales (2011), 8. and G. Duncan, 
“Challenging Competitors' Patents in the UK - Patent Revocation” D Young & Co Intellectual Property Articles & Updates (2010); accessible at 
http://www.dyoung.com/article-patentrevocation.  
117 Smithkline Beecham v Apotex [2004] EWCA Civ 1703; Actavis v Merck [2007] EWHC 1625 (Pat); Generics v Lundbeck [2007] EWHC 1606 (Pat) 
and Monsanto Technology v Cargill International [2007] EWHC 3113 (Pat). 
118 Freshfields, A Guide to Patent Litigation in Europe – England and Wales (2011), 8. 
119 Freshfields, Patent Litigation in Europe – England and Wales (2007), 1.  
120 Rambus Inc v Micron Europe Ltd/Rambus Inc v Hyundai Electronics UK Ltd, Laddie J., December 19, 2000 (unreported). 
121 Rambus Inc v Hynix Semiconductor UK Ltd and another [2004] EWHC 2313 (Pat); [2004] All ER (D) 587 (Jul). Hynix Semiconductor UK Limited 
was previously known as Hyundai Electronics UK Limited. 
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approximately £300,000.122 The PHC stated that Nokia was entitled to its costs, though the court did not 
apportion a specific percentage. For IPCom this would have come as a sharp blow because although its own 
costs (£300,000) were much smaller than Nokia’s (£1.3 million), as the losing party it was liable to pay the other 
side’s costs as well as its own. In a separate hearing on the same day, the PHC also had to discuss costs for other 
related cases in the series. Floyd J. stated: “The costs are very substantial, exceeding on both sides the sum of £2 
million. Nokia's costs come in close to £3 million.”123 
The PHC awarded Nokia a 66% share of its costs. Considering that its overall costs were around £3 million, 
IPCom were likely to be liable to pay Nokia around £2 million. 
In contrast to the US legal system where costs are not recoverable, for PAEs, losing the substantive issues of 
validity in an infringement case before the PHC can have serious consequences. Even if the PAE can keep its 
own costs at a low level, if the PAE loses the case it will probably have to pay a large proportion of the other 
party’s costs, which may be substantial. In the cases discussed above, we observe that the PAEs were indeed 
liable to the payment of substantial amounts to the winning parties. This may represent an important restraining 
factor with regard to the ability of PAEs to sue in the UK – especially relative to the US where costs are non-
recoverable. The available evidence for the US shows that PAEs lose a substantial share of their lawsuits, which 
is also much larger a fraction than that of producing companies,124 which means that such cost-shifting could 
have a potentially large effect on PAEs’ ability to litigate.125 
It is also interesting to note that this characteristic of the enforcement system in England and Wales seems 
to outweigh the potential positive effect of a high-cost system on attracting PAE litigation. PAEs may find it 
easier to file nuisance lawsuits in jurisdictions in which engaging in a lawsuit is extremely costly because alleged 
infringers may prefer a slightly less costly settlement with a certain outcome to a potentially ruinous protracted 
legal dispute. Hence, in principle, the enforcement system of England and Wales could attract PAEs. But our 
empirical evidence suggests that the combination of a high likelihood of losing a case and the liability to paying 
the winner’s (substantial) costs of engaging in the legal action outweighs any benefits that a high-cost system may 
entail for PAEs.  
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
We analyse all patent court cases involving PAEs before the PHC during 2000-2008 to show that the PHC does 
not provide a welcome venue for PAEs to undertake litigation. Firstly, the majority of cases involving a PAE 
which reach a judgment result in a ruling invalidating the patent. In cases involving PAEs during 2000-2008, only 
in one minor part of one case was a PAE patent found to be valid. The likelihood of a patent being declared 
invalid by the PHC is therefore high, especially so in comparison to the available evidence on PAE litigation in 
the US. In our analysis, we argue that the costs regime in the legal system of England and Wales, which requires 
that the losing party must pay the costs of the other side, acts as another break on PAE litigation. In the PHC 
enforcement system, a PAE which loses a case may have to pay a substantial amount of money to pay the costs 
                                                     
122 Nokia GMBH v IPCom GMBH & Co KG costs hearing [2010] EWHC 790 (Pat). 
123 Nokia GMBH v IPCom GMBH & Co KG costs hearing [2010] EWHC 791 (Pat), paragraph 1. 
124 J. Allison, M. Lemley, and J. Walker, ‘Patent Quality and Settlement among Repeat Patent Litigants,’ The Georgetown Law Journal  99 (2011), 
677-712. 
125 This potential seems to have been recognized by Rep. Peter de Fazio and Rep. Jason Chaffetz who proposed a bill in August 2012 in the US 
House of Representatives (the `Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2012’) that would force 
claimants to pay defendants’ legal costs in case they lose their action and the court finds that “the party alleging the infringement of the patent 
did not have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding.” This mechanism is limited to computer hardware or software patents (as defined by the bill). 
See https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/SHIELD_ACT_0.pdf andhttp://www.globallegalpost.com/corporate-counsel/shield-act-set-to-
defend-tech-companies-from-patent-trolls/. 
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of the other side even if its own costs are kept low. When taken together, the high likelihood of having a patent 
invalidated combined with the large costs which tend to accrue if a case is lost appear to discourage litigation by 
PAEs. In fact PAE litigation at the PHC is relatively uncommon when compared to other jurisdictions such as 
the US:126 only 15 out of 255 patent cases involved a PAE, where a substantial number of these cases were 
between the same parties. We only find 8 PAEs to have been involved in litigation before the PHC during the 
nine-year period studied, and in most cases these were not infringement cases but cases where manufacturers 
attempted to `clear the way’ by bringing patent revocation cases before the court.127 As a result, there is good 
reason to assume that within the UK the problems associated with PAEs stifling innovation are somewhat 
mitigated (at least for the period of our study). Nevertheless, eight out of fifteen cases involving PAEs resulted in 
a settlement, which shows that even with respect to PHC cases PAE litigation may result in lucrative financial 
settlements. With regard to the characteristics of the enforcement system, our study demonstrates that the 
provision of a court which undertakes an in-depth analysis of patent validity, combined with a ‘loser pays’ costs 
approach, helps to discourage PAE litigation. These two elements, among others, appear to work against the 
possibility that a surge in PAE litigation, such as that which has already occurred in the US, will occur in Europe. 
This ought to be taken into account with respect to the proposed Unified Patent Court, the details of which are 
currently being debated by European policy makers. 
 
                                                     
126 C. Chien, ‘Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents,’ North Carolina Law Review 
87 (2009), 1571-1615, at 1572. 
127 Most of the litigated patents have been granted by the EPO. Yet, since EPO patents have to be validated separately in each country signatory 
to the European Patent Convention, the invalidation of an EPO patent by a court in one jurisdiction has no direct implications on its validity in 
any of the other jurisdictions. This means that a PAE patent that has been invalidated by the PHC can still be enforced, for example, in Germany 
(provided it has been validated there). Nevertheless, companies can use the favourable PHC ruling in parallel proceedings to press for favourable 
settlements in other jurisdictions. This, in turn, implies that companies may not be primarily interested in `clearing the way’ in the UK, but use 
the enforcement system of England and Wales strategically for other purposes. 
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Appendix - Data description 
We collected data on all court cases filed between 2000 and 2008 at the PHC, the Court of Appeal and the House 
of Lords/Supreme Court. Due to the possible long lag time between the filing of a case and a final decision, in 
particular if the decision rendered by the first instance is appealed, we can only include court cases that were filed 
before 2009 to avoid the presence of a substantial number of potentially still pending cases in our dataset. Given 
our interest in patent litigation, we exclude all cases that represent an appeal to an administrative decision taken 
by the UKIPO. We complemented the data with data from court cases heard before the PCC (Central London 
County Court) which we obtained from the UKIPO. Because the information on cases at the PCC had to be 
collected directly from the PCC, we only have detailed information on cases heard in 2007 and 2008. 
We collected the data on court cases at the PHC from a range of sources. Our starting point was the Patents 
Court Diary which lists all cases which are scheduled for a hearing or an application including, for example, a case 
management conference.128 This means, in principle, the Diary contains all cases for which the claim form has 
been served and to which the defence has responded. The Diary provides basic information on court cases, 
including the case number, the names of claimants and defendants (usually only the first claimant and defendant), 
their legal representatives, the date the hearing was fixed, as well as the hearing dates and the duration of the 
hearing. In a number of cases, the Diary also notes additional information, such as whether a case was 
discontinued because of a settlement or stay. We use the information from the Diary to search for court records 
on the website of the British and Irish Legal Information Institute,129 the case database of Lexis Nexis,130 as well 
as Thomson Reuters’s Westlaw database.131 However, these sources did not offer any records for a number of 
cases (mostly those settled at an early stage). For these cases we searched additional sources, such as media 
websites, blogs or the websites of legal representatives for information. 
The most basic information that we collected for all cases includes the names of all litigating parties, their 
country of residence (the country in which a firm is registered), the type of litigating party (e.g. company, 
individual, etc.), the year the claim form was served, and the type of IPR in dispute. Additional detailed 
information on the case was collected for all court cases that involved a patent. The information was collected 
and input into a standardised format.132 The standardised template contains information on the 
proceedings/decision type, litigating parties, the IPR in dispute, the claims made in the case, the relief applied for, 
the outcome/content of the judgment, and any information on the value, costs, and potential damages associated 
with the case. We also include information on related cases within the England and Wales jurisdiction as well as 
abroad if mentioned in the available court records. 
While our datasets represent the most comprehensive database gathered so far on the subject of patent 
litigation in the UK, at least two caveats are in order.133 Firstly, obviously the court data provides us only with 
data on cases that have made it to court. Relying on the court diary, however, means that we only observe cases 
that not only have been filed to the court, but were allowed to proceed at least to the case management stage. 
There is no information available on the number of cases that are dropped between the serving of the claim form 
and the case appearing on the diary. However, informal conversations we conducted with practitioners lead us to 
believe that this figure is negligible. Secondly, since we had to assemble the information with regard to each court 
case, often relying on different sources, in many cases the available court records are incomplete. For example, 
while we may have the judgment of the PHC, we may not have records for all preceding applications. There is 
nevertheless a core set of variables which we were able to obtain for all cases. However, the investigation of 
                                                     
128 http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/list_patents_diary.htm.  
129 http://www.bailii.org.  
130 http://www.lexisnexis.co.uk.  
131 http://www.westlaw.co.uk.  
132 The standardised case template was created in collaboration with Ulrike Till. 
133 The data used by Moss et al. (see footnote 57) only contain court cases between January 2008 and August 2009 heard by the Patents County 
Court, the Patents Court, the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords. 
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certain specific aspects of patent litigation, such as the issue of costs, focuses on the subset of court cases for 
which more detailed information is available. 
As part of our analysis we combine the information obtained from court records with detailed information 
on the parties as well as the specific patents involved in the law suits. The names of the litigating parties were 
matched to Compustat, Bureau van Dijk’s FAME and AMADEUS, and the ICC British Company Directory 
databases in order to obtain information on firms’ characteristics and financials. Detailed information on the 
litigated patents was obtained from EPO’s Espacenet and PATSTAT (version October 2011). We also draw on 
PATSTAT to construct a control sample of patents that have not been litigated. The control sample consists of 
non-litigated patents that share the same priority year, priority filing authority, and IPC subclasses with the 
litigated patents in the 15 PAE court cases. This control sample allows us to compare the characteristics of 
litigated patents with those of patents that were not subject of litigation at the invention level (the priority filing). 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of litigated patents by age 
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Figure 2: Comparison of litigated patents across technology classes 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
E
le
ct
ric
al
 e
ng
in
ee
rin
g
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
C
he
m
is
try
M
ec
ha
ni
ca
l e
ng
in
ee
rin
g
O
th
er
E
le
ct
ric
al
 e
ng
in
ee
rin
g
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
C
he
m
is
try
M
ec
ha
ni
ca
l e
ng
in
ee
rin
g
O
th
er
All other PAE
#
 P
a
te
n
ts
 
Note: Other includes: Furniture & games, other consumer goods, and civil engineering.
Figure 3: Distribution of patents in PAE cases across technology classes 
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Table 1: All cases involving PAEs 
Yearʶ Case Reference Claimant Defendant Claim Outcome 
2000 HC00C4176/HC00C4177 Rambus inc Hyundai Electronics UK ltd infringement stayed* 
   
Micron Europe ltd 
  2004 HC04C01952 Nokia Interdigital Technology corp. revocation settled 
2005 HC05C01175 T-Mobile UK ltd Inpro Licensing sarl revocation revoked 
  
Research in Motion UK 
ltd 
   
2005 HC05C02026 Nokia Interdigital Technology corp. 
non-infringement/ 
standard 
essentiality 
3 out of 4 
patents not 
infringed 
2006 HC06C00615/HC06C00835 Sandisk Koninklijke Philips revocation settledˣ 
   
Societa Italiana per lo Sviluppo 
dell'Elettronica spa (SISVEL) 
  
   
Institut für Rundfunktechnik 
GmbH 
  
   
TDF 
  
   
France Telecom s.a. 
  
2006 HC06C03912/HC06C04227 Research in Motion ltd Visto corp revocation revoked 
  
Research in Motion UK 
ltd 
   
2006 HC06C04422 
Interdigital Technology 
corp Nokia 
non-infringement/ 
standard 
essentiality settled 
   
Nokia Siemens Networks oy 
  
2006 HC06C01151 European Central Bank 
Document Security Systems 
(DDS) revocation revoked 
2008 HC08C02525 Nokia IPcom gmbh revocation revoked 
  
Nokia Germany gmbh 
   
  
Nokia UK ltd 
   2008 HC08C02526 Nokia Germany gmbh IPcom gmbh revocation settled 
2008 HC08C02527 Nokia Germany gmbh IPcom gmbh revocation settled 
2008 HC08C02528 Nokia Germany gmbh IPcom gmbh revocation settled 
2008 HC08C02530 Nokia Germany gmbh IPcom gmbh revocation settled 
2008 HC08C02901 
Research in Motion UK 
ltd Visto corp revocation revoked 
  
Research in Motion ltd 
   
2008 HC08C00200 
Gemstar TV Guide 
International inc Virgin Media Payments ltd infringement revoked 
  
United Video Properties 
inc Virgin Media ltd 
      Starsight Telecast inc       
Notes: 
     PAEs marked in bold 
ʶYear refers to the year in which the lawuit was initiated (filing of claim form) 
  * Pending EPO opposition (eventually revoked by EPO) 
ˣ Sandisk took a license from SISVEL 
 
          
Table 2: Comparison claims 
 
Claim 
 
All* PAE 
  # Cases % # Cases % 
     Infringement 107 44.6% 2 13.3% 
Revocationˣ 68 28.3% 11 73.3% 
Other 27 11.3% 2 13.3% 
NA 38 15.8% 0 0.0% 
          
Total 240 100.0% 15 100.0% 
Notes: 
    * Excludes PAE cases 
   ˣ Includes partial revocation 
    
                              
Table 3: Comparison outcomes 
 
Outcome 
  
Claim Infringed 
Valid, not 
infringed Revokedˣ Settled Other NA Total 
  All* PAE All* PAE All* PAE All* PAE All* PAE All* PAE All* PAE 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Infringement 15% 0% 10% 0% 25% 50% 24% 0% 11% 50% 14% 0% 
 
  
 
16 0 11 0 27 1 26 0 12 1 15 0 107 2 
Revocationˣ 4% 0% 22% 0% 43% 36% 19% 64% 9% 0% 3% 0% 
 
  
 
3 0 15 0 29 4 13 7 6 0 2 0 68 11 
Other 4% 50% 4% 0% 4% 0% 11% 50% 63% 0% 15% 0% 
 
  
 
1 1 1 0 1 0 3 1 17 0 4 0 27 2 
NA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 53% 0% 3% 0% 45% 0% 
 
  
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 1 0 17 0 38 0 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  20 1 27 0 57 5 62 8 36 1 38 0 240 15 
Notes: 
              * Excludes PAE cases 
             ˣ Includes partial revocation 
             
                        
Table 4: Comparison PAE vs other litigated & non-litigated patents 
 
Mean Std. Dev. T-test** Min Max # Obs.  
Control PAE Control PAE difference Control PAE Control PAE Control PAE 
Comparison with other litigated patents* 
Backward citations 3.76 2.39 4.22 2.67 1.99 0 0 21 10 168 41 
Forward citations 11.10 5.82 22.87 15.52 1.39 0 0 161 62 168 41 
Non-patent references 1.85 1.73 4.04 2.20 0.19 0 0 38 10 168 41 
Family Size*** 19.63 24.34 20.80 23.73 -1.26 1 1 140 69 168 41 
Number of inventors 2.86 3.05 2.23 2.15 -0.48 1 1 19 9 167 41 
Number of IPC Subclasses 2.27 3.92 1.29 2.43 -5.99 1 1 8 9 168 41 
   Comparison with non-litigated patentsˣ  
Backward citations 1.09 2.39 2.11 2.67 -3.84 0 0 17 10 1,661 41 
Forward citations 1.99 5.82 7.23 15.52 -3.22 0 0 169 62 1,661 41 
Non-patent references 0.34 1.73 1.08 2.20 -7.83 0 0 13 10 1,661 41 
Family Size*** 7.31 24.34 9.17 23.73 -11.03 1 1 183 69 1,661 41 
Number of inventors 2.59 3.05 1.90 2.15 -1.51 1 1 22 9 1,556 41 
Number of IPC Subclasses 1.03 3.92 0.18 2.43 -44.08 1 1 3 9 1,661 41 
* Other litigated patents means all available patents litigated at the PHC between 2000-2008 excluding those involved in PAE cases 
  ˣ Control patents matched to PAE patents on priority filing year and authority as well as IPC subsclasses. 
     ** Differences that are statistically significant at <5% level in bold. 
        *** Defined according to EPO'S DOCDB family definition. 
          
          
Table 5: Comparison industry distribution 
Sector All other cases* PAE Casesˣ 
  # Firms % # Firms % 
     Business services 19 3.8% 1 8% 
Chemicals/pharma 170 33.9% 
  Computer services 21 4.2% 
  Construction 4 0.8% 
  FIRE** 3 0.6% 
  Food etc 1 0.2% 
  Hightech 83 16.6% 8 66.7% 
Metals & machinery 64 12.8% 
  Other manufacturing 26 5.2% 
  R&D services 13 2.6% 
  Textiles & apparel 4 0.8% 
  Trade 39 7.8% 
  Transportation 7 1.4% 
  Wood & paper 6 1.2% 
  Other services 16 3.2% 1 8% 
Telecommunications 15 3.0% 2 17% 
Petroleum & refining 10 2.0% 
    501   12   
Notes: 
    * Excludes PAE cases 
    ˣ Excludes the European Central Bank 
   ** FIRE: finance, insurance, and real estate 
    
                  
Table A1: All patents of PAE cases 
# Case reference Patent number 
         1 HC00C4176/HC00C4177 EP0525068 
      2 HC04C01952 GB2174571 GB2208774 GB2224114 
    3 HC05C01175 EP0892947 
      4 HC05C02026 EP0515610 EP0855807 EP1062749 EP1210777 
   5 HC06C00615/HC06C00835* EP0402973 EP0599824 EP0599825 EP0660540 EP0400755 EP0708533 EP0751520 
6 HC06C03912/HC06C04227 EP0996905 EP1096727 EP1126662 
   7 HC06C04422 
       8 HC06C01151 EP0455750 
      9 HC08C02525 EP0540808 EP1186189 EP1273147 
    10 HC08C02526 EP1214813 EP1287716 EP1252779 
    11 HC08C02527 EP1083758 EP1273147 EP1121760 
    12 HC08C02528 EP1238474 EP1240758 EP0880836 
    13 HC08C02530 EP0581929 EP0962084 EP1083763 EP1316199 
   14 HC08C02901 EP1722321 EP1783675 EP1785927 
    15 HC08C00200** EP0969662 EP1377049 EP1613066 
                      
Notes: 
        Shaded gray patents have different assignee name than PAE name in EPO's Espacenet online database 
Patents (EP1096727, EP1126662) marked in bold are owned by Research in Motion 
* Patents assigned to Philipps. 
** Patents EP0969662 and EP1613066 assigned to co-claimant United Video Properties inc and EP1377049 to co-claimant Starsight 
Telecast inc. 
 
# Non-PAE PAE
1 European Central Bank Document Security Systems (DDS)
2 Hyundai Electronics UK ltd Gemstar TV Guide International inc
3 Micron Europe ltd Inpro Licensing sarl
4 Nokia Interdigital Technology corp
5 Nokia Germany gmbh IPcom gmbh
6 Nokia Siemens Networks oy Rambus inc
7 Nokia UK ltd
Societa Italiana per lo Sviluppo 
dell'Elettronica spa (SISVEL)
8 Research in Motion ltd Visto corp
9 Research in Motion UK ltd
10 Sandisk
11 T-Mobile UK ltd
12 Virgin Media ltd
13 Virgin Media Payments ltd
Table A2: Overview PAEs and Non-PAEs
